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REJOINDER
JOEL B. DIRLAM' AND ALFRED E. KAHN't
Our article reached two conclusions, one legal and the other eco-
nomic. The first conclusion was that the A & P decisions do not threaten
the legality of vertical or horizontal integration. The second was that,
apart from divestiture of the manufacturing subsidiaries, the dissolution
of A & P sought by the Department of Justice would not have resulted
in less effective competition in grocery retailing. We are gratified that
so acute and diligent a critic as Professor Adelman apparently has no
quarrel with these conclusions or the arguments supporting them.
Cost-plus pricing
Adelman centers his fire on our failure to become agitated about the
prosecutioies alleged advocacy of cost-plus pricing. Since, as we pointed
out,' in deciding whether the A & P cases were an economic catastrophe
it is "more important" to look to the decisions of the courts, this criti-
cism is, after all, a minor one. In adversary proceedings, attorneys are
prone to offer any number of alternative legal theories in the hope that
if theory A fails, B will succeed; also "it is [always] possible to appeal
from the government drunk to the government sober" 2 and find support
for all sorts of contradictory theories. As Adelman hLs elsewhere ad-
mitted,3 and as we ourselves state at the outset of our appraisal of the
promotional pricing defense of A & P policies,4 neither of the court opin-
ions can be construed as advocating or endorsing the heretical cost-plus
doctrine. The issue between us and our critic is therefore narrowed to
the relatively insignificant problem of interpreting a rejected portion of
a District Court brief.'
t Lecturer in Economics, Connecticut College.
tAssociate Professor of Economics, Cornell University.
1. P. 2. All page references herein will be to the authors' article, Integration and
Dissolution of thw A & P Company, 29 IND. L.J. 1 (1953), unless otherwise indicated.
2. P. 5.
3. Adelman, The Great A & P Muddle, 40 FoRTuNE 123 (Dec. 1949)..
4. P. 18.
5. Adelman is correct in charging that our footnote reference (p. 21 n.78) to
"isolated phrases" in the District Court brief unduly minimizes the extent to which the
koverhment embraced the abhorrent doctrine. Our error resulted, in part, from relying
primarily upon the brief in the Court of Appeals for our analysis of the government's
position. The language of that brief, at the point where it directs itself specifically to
the promotional pricing defense, makes it obvious that the objection was not simply to
sales at a loss but rather to their financing by profits from other areas by discriminatory
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
It is in pages 94 to 138 of the Brief that objections to low gross
profit rates are set forth without being linked either to geographical price
discrimination or allegedly illegal headquarters allowances. 6 Neverthe-
less, the summary of the argument of that portion of the brief states:
"These low .. .profits were made possible . . .by requiring
those Divisions ...satisfactory from the standpoint of volume to
make good the deficits thus incurred by the unsatisfactory Divisions.
.* * That . .. was.., an abuse of the A & P System's horizontal
integration ..
Thus, even here the government objected to the discriminatory char-
acter of the "promotional pricing," a point Adelman consistently over-
looks." In view of our doubts that the government clearly advocated
cost-plus pricing outside the special context of the A & P practices, and
especially in view of the courts' failure to adopt the doctrine, we are
unable to share Adelman's fear that the case represents "a direct 'attack
on the competitive process."
Predatory tactics
There is no point in reciting in detail instances of predatory pricing
tactics. Judge Lindley's opinion gives a number of them, as does our
article. "Cheap and easy" entry into grocery retailing may have made
these tactics unintelligent, but there is no doubt that the Company em-
ployed them. Moreover, we find it difficult to reconcile Adelman's as-
sumptions about ease of entry with his enthusiasm for A & P's vastly
superior efficiency. In his model, grocery retailing seems to be an indus-
try where economies of scale (achieved in part through "promotional
pricing") should produce oligopolistic conditions. One cannot have it
both ways: that entry is easy, on the one hand; and that, on the other,
a $4 billion dollar chain is far more efficient than a $500 million one,
and that promotional pricing will produce ever lower unit costs.
purchasing concessions. Gov't Brief 373-374, United States v. New York Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
6. In contrast, the hostility to reduction of gross profit rates demonstrated in the
section on "price wars," Gov't Brief 628-987, United States v. New York Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946), is premised upon the assumed
illegality of using headquarter's allowances to compensate for low or negative retail
profits. Adelman views this assumption as an attack on vertical integration per se. The
point is, however, that the government and courts felt that these "profits" were (except
for those from manufacturing) tainted at their source.
7. Gov't Brief 86-87, United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946).
8. See p. 19 n.65.
COMMENTS
Adelman twits us for the paucity of clear-cut evidence that A & P's
gunning for competitors scored so few bulls-eyes, a lack that we ex-
plicitly pointed out. The reason-which should be familiar to anyone
who has ever wrestled with the evidence in antitrust suits (including
even such "obvious" examples of predatory monopolies as the old Stand-
ard Oil trust)-is the difficulty of ever attributing to one causal factor
the disappearance of a competitor or the attainment of a large share of
the market. This is why the courts, wisely, we believe, have generally
refused to make elaborate inquiries into the market consequences of
predatory tactics. It is illegal even to attempt to monopolize. The record
in the A & P case contains ample evidence of the requisite intent.
However, we did not say that no exclusion actually resulted from
A & P's tactics. That its policies of "putting on the heat" and attempt-
ing to get discriminatory concessions, where successful, must have helped
it maintain or increase its market shares, we still have no doubt.
Gross profit rates and losses
A & P became worried about loss of its market in New England in
1931.' In 1932, the then President of the New England Division secured
the Hartfords' approval "to reduce the net profit rate . . . to procure
more volume. . ".."10 Because the profit rate had not been sufficiently
cut, Byrnes was made President of the New England Division in 1934
(not 1940). He immediately put the Division "in the red" (as X & P
phrased it--i.e., before allocation of headquarters allowances) by re-
ducing its gross profit rate in an effort to build up sales volume by lower
prices at retail. In 1935, the increase in volume did not measure up to
expectations based on "the severe reductions we have taken in gross
profits.""-
Hence, although the Boston gross profit rate may have been higher
than the Company average from 1934 to 1939, it is obvious that the
management as early as 1932 was trying to cut prices throughout New
England in an effort to win back volume from First National Stores.
We cannot be as confident as Adelman that the final reduction in the
Boston gross profit rate was responsible for pulling the Unit out of its
nine-year slump. In 1941, sales of all grocery chains were 20 percent
higher than in 1940, for obvious reasons. A & P's company-wide in-
crease in sales was 22.8 percent.' 2
9. Gov't Brief 663, United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. III. 1946).
10. Id. at 665.
11. Id. at 674.
12. THE PRoGREsslvE GRocER, FAcTs IN FOOD AND GRocERY DISTRIBUTION AS OF
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What we must emphasize is that no one condemned A & P for suc-
cessful promotional pricing. It was the losses of 1934-1940, at higher
than average margins and admittedly subsidized by operating profits
elsewhere,' 3 not the profits of 1941 and thereafter that the government
and courts condemned as an unreasonable burden on competitors and an
abuse of A & P's horizontal integration.
A & P's efficiency and comparative margins
First, the OPA compilation that Adelman cites to demonstrate
A & P's superior efficiency lumps in its largest-size group--which Adel-
man necessarily excludes from his comparisons-A & P and four un-
identified chains with annual sales of over $100,000,000 each in 1942.
Since First National and American Stores, the two chains whose mar-
gins we compared with A & P, both had annual sales exceeding $100,-
000,000 in that year, our comparison is not vitiated by the fact that
expense rates among some small chains were higher than A & P's during
the years covered in the OPA compilation.
Second, Adelman is simply wrong when he says that our compari-
sons of A & P's 1943 performance with post-war figures for its leading
competitors are inappropriate because of a postwar shrinkage in percent-
age marketing margins. Neither the available figures from Moody's14
nor the general opinion in the trade'5 sustain his position.
May we point out again that Adelman has refrained from meeting
our major contention that there is little evidence to show that a $4 billion
chain can operate more efficiently than a $500 million one.
JANUARY 1950, p. 4; A & P Main Brief, chart facing p. 58, United States v. New York
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
13. As late as 1940, headquarters was assuming that the New England Division
would earn nothing on its retail operations, in contrast with the $5,750,000 being made
available from other divisions. Gov't Brief 687-688, United States v. New York Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946).
14. The following gross margins as a percent of sales are taken directly or
computed from Moody's Manual of Industrials:
1943 1950 1951
Kroger -------------------------- 15.9 15.7 15.1
Safeway ------------------------- 18.2 14.6 14.9
American ------------------------ 15.3 16.4 16.6
First National --------------------- 13.1 13.6 13.1
Colonial ------------------------- 16.5 16.5 16.0
15. Margins are thought to be a higher percentage of sales than in 1943. Ceiling
Price Regulation 15, 16 FED. REG. 2735, March 29, 1951, said, in part: "On the whole
the markups used for chains and supermarkets should increase by a little more than 1
percent the margin on sales yielded by the OPA markups .... [T]he chains and super-
markets indicate that an adjustment of approximately 3 percent is required. . . ." One
explanation for the increased post-war margins is the "precipitous rise in labor rates."
Communication from Mr. Paul A. Baumgart, of Oxford Business Surveys, Safeway
Stores, Aug. 10, 1953.
COMMENTS 375
Summary
We do not think that the gulf between us is so wide as Adelman
believes. His propensity to view the A & P case as a study in black and
white, with the Antitrust Division unmistakably identified as the villian,
leads him to neglect the virtues of chiarascuro. We only wish we could
share his simple faith in the power of received economic doctrine so
forthrightly, without use of fuzzy concepts like "intent" or "abuse" or
"reasonable," to resolve problems of antitrust policy.
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